Price Competition in International Mixed Oligopolies by Alessandra Chirco & Marcella Scrimitore
 
 
Copyright belongs to the author. Small sections of the text, not exceeding three paragraphs, can be used 
provided proper acknowledgement is given.  
 
The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis (RCEA) was established in March 2007. RCEA is a private, 
nonprofit organization dedicated to independent research in Applied and Theoretical Economics and related 
fields. RCEA organizes seminars and workshops, sponsors a general interest journal The Review of 
Economic Analysis, and organizes a biennial conference: The Rimini Conference in Economics and Finance 
(RCEF) . The RCEA has a Canadian branch: The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis in Canada (RCEA-
Canada). Scientific work contributed by the RCEA Scholars is published in the RCEA Working Papers and 
Professional Report series. 
 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors. No responsibility for them should be attributed to 
the Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis. 
 
 
The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis  
Legal address: Via Angherà, 22 – Head office: Via Patara, 3 - 47900 Rimini (RN) – Italy 











University of Salento, Lecce, Italy 
 
Marcella Scrimitore 
University of Salento, Lecce, Italy 




PRICE COMPETITION IN INTERNATIONAL 




Abstract In this paper we analyze the eﬀects of international competition in
a mixed oligopoly framework, with price competition and diﬀerentiated prod-
ucts. The properties of equilibria, and the impact of policy measures such as
privatizations and cross-border acquisitions, are studied both in a single-country
and in a two-country framework, under the hypothesis that all ﬁrms share the
same linear technology. Besides showing that the international competition in a
mixed market allows for eﬃciency gains which are consistent with binding bud-
get constraints for the public ﬁrm, we identify the market structures and the
competitive environment which support welfare enhancing privatization policies,
independently of any exogenous or endogenous cost diﬀerential between public
and private producers. In particular, we suggest that the cross-country distrib-
ution of ﬁrms, the degree of product substitutability and the overall density of
the market are the key elements in the assessment of the desirability of public
ownership.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper studies the outcomes of competition in those international oligopolis-
tic markets, where strategic interaction involves welfare-maximizing public and
proﬁt-maximizing private ﬁrms. The reference framework is therefore that of
mixed-oligopoly theory, which we address under the hypothesis that ﬁrms com-
pete over prices, sharing the same linear technology in a market where products
are imperfectly substitutable. These assumptions are consistent with recent
competitive patterns observed on the international scenarios. In these, the pres-
ence of state-owned ﬁrms, still massive on the domestic markets, is increasing
despite the worldwide waves of privatization which have taken place over the
past twenty years. Public ownership, which is commonly observed in network
industries like telecommunications, transports, energy and utilities, character-
izes also a range of services like insurances and banking, postal services, health
care and education. Private and public ﬁrms frequently coexist in these sectors,
which are moreover becoming increasingly exposed to international competition,
in response to the international liberalizations and demand growth.
When dealing with international mixed oligopolies, the key issue arises of
distinguishing between the within-country market interactions, and the interac-
tions among countries. While the former are related to the existence of ﬁrms
(public and private) characterized by diﬀerent motives and to the contribution
of foreign ﬁrms to domestic welfare, the latter concern international compe-
tition in the realization of the governments’ objectives. In order to capture
this distinction, the paper analyzes two diﬀe r e n to p e nm a r k e tf r a m e w o r k s : a
single-country model, where a public ﬁrm interacts with domestic and foreign
private ﬁrms on the home market, and a so-called two-country model, in which
two domestic welfare-maximizing public ﬁrms (one for each country) compete
strategically on a single international market with a number of private ﬁrms from
both countries. A full characterization of equilibria and their welfare properties
in these two scenarios is the basis for an assessment of the eﬀects of changes
in the market structure, such as cross-border acquisitions and privatizations.
When relevant, these eﬀe c t sa r es t u d i e db o t hi nac o u n t r y - s p e c i ﬁc perspective,
and in a global perspective.
As far as the single-country model is concerned, our main result is that un-
der price competition and diﬀerentiated product the presence of international
competitors in the domestic market induces an overall convergence to eﬃcient
pricing, and is consistent with binding budget constraints of the public ﬁrm even
under constant average and marginal costs. This also holds under Stackelberg
price competition, provided that the presence of foreign competitors is not too
large. In the more articulated two-country set-up, we show that the degree of
product substitutability, the degree of asymmetry in the cross-country distrib-
ution of ﬁrms, and the overall number of ﬁrms, determine the conditions for a
price reversal between public and private ﬁrms to occur, and crucially aﬀect the
country-speciﬁc and the aggregate welfare evaluation of privatizations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 puts our results in context by
sketching the main relevant related literature. The single-country model with
2simultaneous and sequential moves, and the two-country model are developed
in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. In the latter we also gather some conclusions.
2 The related literature
Mixed oligopoly theory has remarkably developed in the last two decades by
pointing out those situations in which interactions between private and pub-
lic ﬁrms lead to a higher social desirability as compared to a fully privatized
context, thus contributing to the debate on privatization. Eﬃciency, strategic
and political arguments have been invoked to provide a theoretical support to
the idea that mixed public-private markets can dominate the alternative of pure
private markets. The most commonly adopted framework is one in which public
ownership is associated with pure welfare maximization objectives,1 and ﬁrms
compete over quantities under increasing marginal costs.
In a framework of strategic interaction, a number of works attributes the
welfare-enhancing character of a mixed market to the incentives of the public
ﬁrm to expand total output, thus indirectly regulating markets. Indeed, under
quantity competition a publicly owned ﬁrm produces the quantity at which the
clearing price equals the marginal cost; this implies a greater aggregate market
production than that observed in a market with only proﬁt-concerned ﬁrms, and
therefore a higher eﬃciency. In this context, however, De Fraja and Delbono
(1989) make an important warning about the role of increasing marginal costs:
the presence of this high producing ﬁrm may impact negatively on welfare due
to its higher average and marginal costs. While welfare is positively aﬀected by
the boost to production, it is negatively aﬀected, under quadratic costs, by an
unequal sharing of production between the public and the private ﬁrms.2 The
spread in the produced quantities and the associated welfare losses are higher,
the larger is the number of private ﬁrms in the market. In these circumstances
privatization may lead to welfare improvements.
In the context of mixed oligopolies, privatization is to be positively con-
sidered also when it induces a ﬁrm’s restructuring which improves the overall
eﬃciency and productivity. Many works focus on these cost-saving reasons
which justify a change of ownership from public to private, on the assumption,
often derived from a conventional wisdom, that public ﬁrms are less eﬃcient.3
As pointed out by De Fraia (1991), in these circumstances the beneﬁcial eﬀects
1Some authors assume that public ﬁrms maximize a weighted average of welfare and their
own proﬁts, thus tackling partial privatization. The search for the optimal degree of govern-
ment ownership in the privatized ﬁr m si sac o r ei s s u eo ft h i sl i t e r a t u r e .S e eM a t s u m u r a( 1 9 9 8 )
as a major reference.
2In this case, though public and private ﬁrms share the same technology, at equilibrium the
public ﬁrm is endogenously less eﬃcient, the eﬃciency gap basically reﬂecting the diﬀerences
in ﬁrms’ objectives.
3Managerial slackness and higher agency costs are often invoked as reasons for the lower
eﬃciency attributed to public companies. Willner (1999) points to the higher wages paid
under public ownership as an explanation for lower cost eﬃciency. This belief, however, has
been often challenged and does not receive unanimous consensus, neither in the theoretical nor
in the empirical literature (see Björkroth et al (2006), p.180, and the papers referred therein).
3of privatization crucially depend on the size of the technological eﬃciency gains,
which must be high enough to oﬀset the welfare loss due to the ﬁrm’s output con-
traction once the privatization is realized. A rationale for public ownership has
a l s ob e e nf o u n di ni t sb e i n ga ni n s t r u m e n tt o achieve political, social, industrial
and environmental goals. White (2002) shows that governments can strategi-
cally manipulate the public ﬁrms’ objective functions in order to disguise their
real political orientation and to actually pursue aims which diﬀer from those
publicly stated.4 Moreover, the presence of public ﬁrms has been considered
socially beneﬁcial when in the bargaining process they allow for higher wages
(Willner, 1999), or when their positive impact on social welfare is through their
contribution to investment in R&D (Poyago-Theotoky, 1998). Finally, public
more than private ownership is to be invoked when governments pursue an envi-
ronmental policy: public ﬁrms may internalize their environmental damages and
ensure a higher revenue from environmental taxes (Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón,
2006).
The recent extension of the analysis of mixed oligopoly to an international
framework has raised several issues, which are of interest for both industrial
organization and international trade theory: from the impact of privatizations
in international markets to the eﬀectiveness of open-door policies and cross-
borders acquisitions. Several papers analyze international competition in a
single-country mixed market. Among these, Fjell and Pal (1996) extend the
model by De Fraia and Delbono to allow for the competition of foreign private
ﬁrms in addition to the domestic ones, while Pal and White (1998) analyze pri-
vatizations in the presence of subsidies or tariﬀs. More recent works tackle the
public-private interactions in international markets within two-country models,
in which competition among private and public ﬁr m si sa d d r e s s e da sp a r to f
strategic competition between governments. In this line, Dadpay and Heywood
(2006) oﬀer an exhaustive analysis of the equilibria under quantity competition
and decreasing returns to scale, showing that welfare gains are typically associ-
ated to coordinated privatization, though the strategic motives of governments
do not create the appropriate unilateral incentives to privatize. Using a similar
framework, Han and Ogawa (2008) examine the optimal extent of privatization,
while Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2005) develop a setting with asymmetric con-
stant marginal costs, where the decision of one government to privatize depend
on the relative cost advantage of the private ﬁrms over the publicly-owned ﬁrm.
With the exception of the duopoly model by Ohnishi (2010), the analysis of
international mixed oligopolies has been developed under quantity competition
in a homogeneous product market. This calls for the additional assumption of
decreasing returns to scale, constant returns being inconsistent in that frame-
4Most of the economic literature, however, looks at the political interference within state-
owned enterprises as a reason for their privatization. By assigning external objectives to public
ﬁrms, Estrin and Perotin (1991) show how politician may contribute to amplify the agency
problem at the ﬁrm or state level, and to weaken the capital market pressure which would
motivate public managers towards eﬃciency. Public enterprises are also viewed by Boycko et
al (1996) as a means to pursue political objectives, such as excess employment; also in this
case privatization is invoked for the eﬃciency gains it may generate in underperforming ﬁrms.
4work with a non-negative proﬁt condition for the public ﬁrm. This paper con-
tributes to the existing literature by developing a general international mixed-
oligopoly model under price-competition and imperfect product substitutability.
The main theoretical advantage of this set-up is that price competition, by en-
larging signiﬁcantly the set of market conﬁgurations in which the public ﬁrms’
budget constraint is consistent with constant average and marginal costs, allows
us to rule out any exogenous or endogenous technological asymmetry between
public and private ﬁrms, so that the properties of equilibria and their policy
implications rely exclusively on the characteristics of strategic interaction.
3 The single-country framework
We consider a country (for simplicity, the home country H), in which a public
domestic ﬁrm i interacts in the market for a diﬀerentiated product with a num-
ber of private ﬁrms, m of which are domestic, and n come from the rest of the
world (for simplicity, F). The total number of ﬁrms operating in the market is
therefore m + n +1 .A l lﬁrms are characterized by the same linear technology,
and produce at a constant average and marginal cost c.
The representative consumer shows quasi-linear quadratic preferences, which




where e Ps =
P
v6=s pv is the sum of the prices of all the other ﬁrms and γ is the
degree of product substitutability, ranging from 0 (absence of substitutability)
to 1 (homogeneous products).5
As standard in mixed oligopoly models, the public ﬁrm maximizes social
welfare, while all private ﬁrms are proﬁt-maximizing. In a single-country frame-
work, the social welfare is deﬁned as the sum of consumer surplus (CS)o v e r
all the m + n +1varieties, and the aggregate proﬁts of domestic ﬁrms (Πh):
obviously the proﬁts of foreign ﬁrms do not enter the public ﬁrm’s objective
function. Firms compete simultaneously over prices. In the sequel, domestic
private ﬁrms are indexed with h, while foreign private ﬁrms are indexed with f.





















can be expressed in terms of prices by using (1) for all domestic and foreign
varieties. The solution yields the best reply of the public ﬁrm as a function of
5O u ra n a l y s i si sa l s or o b u s tt oam o d e ls p e c i ﬁcation with the Shubik and Levitan (1980) de-
mand function, which captures product substitutability under the hypothesis that the market







Notice that this reaction function exhibits the standard strategic complementar-
ity of price decisions. However, this occurs with respect to the private domestic
ﬁrms only: the public ﬁrm’s price is strategically independent of the price of the
foreign private ﬁrms, notwithstanding the fact that the latter enters the public
ﬁrm’s objective function through both the consumers’ surplus and the aggregate
domestic proﬁts. Under constant average and marginal costs, the foreign rivals’
behavior aﬀects the impact of a marginal change of the public ﬁrm’s price on
the consumers’ surplus with the same magnitude but opposite sign as it aﬀects
the marginal impact of the public ﬁrm on aggregate domestic proﬁts. In the
extreme case in which the public ﬁrm interacts with foreign ﬁrms only (m =0 ),
its optimal reaction is to set a price equal to marginal cost, independently of n
and independently of the prices set by the rivals.6
As far as private domestic ﬁrms are concerned, for the generic ﬁrm h proﬁt










k∈{H−h} pk denotes the sum of the prices of the private domestic ﬁrms











g∈{F−f} pg denotes the sum of the prices of the foreign domestic ﬁrms















Equations (5)—(6) and (2) can be solved simultaneously for pi,
P
h∈{H} ph and P















with z = h,f. This solution conﬁrms the result by Anderson et al (1997) and
Ghosh and Mitra (2010), that in a closed-economy framework (which can be
6This result extends to a general oligopoly setting the mixed-duopoly model by Ohnishi
(2010).
6recovered by setting n =0in our solution) a public ﬁrm competing over prices
sets a price higher than the marginal cost, though lower than that of its pri-
vate rivals. This is in sharp contrast with the behavior we would observe under
quantity competition, where for all quantities produced by the private ﬁrms,
the public ﬁrm reacts by producing the amount of its own product for which
the market clearing price equals the marginal cost. Indeed, under quantity com-
petition a marginal increase in the public ﬁrm’s production would not aﬀect,
for given quantities of the rivals, the contribution of the private ﬁrms to wel-




— so long as its clearing price exceeds the marginal cost. Under price
competition, for given choices of the rivals, a price reduction by the public ﬁrm
reduces the marginal contribution of the private ﬁrms to welfare, and this mit-
igates its incentive to price at marginal cost. Aggressiveness in prices is more
detrimental for the private ﬁrms contribution to welfare than aggressiveness in
quantities, and this explains why we do not observe eﬃcient pricing of the pub-
lic ﬁrm under price competition. Strategic complementarity implies that the
diﬀerences between public and private prices are lower under price competition.
The existence of foreign ﬁrms obviously makes for a stronger aggressiveness
of the public ﬁrm both under quantity and under price competition. In the latter
case, the properties of equilibrium are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In a single-country mixed oligopoly with price competition, the
public ﬁrm sets a price pN
i such that the mark-up over the marginal cost is
decreasing in the share of foreign ﬁrms, and converges to zero when all private
ﬁrms are foreign. The price of the public ﬁrm is lower than the price of the






being decreasing in γ.
Foreign ﬁrms contribute to the public ﬁrm’s objective function only through
the consumer surplus, so that the negative eﬀect of a reduction of pi on their
proﬁts is neglected when domestic welfare is maximized. However, pi converges
to the marginal cost only when no domestic private ﬁrms are active in the
market. The relative weight of foreign ﬁrms in satisfying consumers’ demand
exerts a marked downward pressure on prices, but this eﬀect of market inter-
nationalization does not rely on the competition among private ﬁrms; rather,
it derives from the objectives pursued by the public ﬁrm. Notice that under
quantity competition and constant marginal costs, market openness would be
inconsistent with a non-negative proﬁt constraint of the public ﬁrm.7
These properties of equilibrium have clear consequences in terms of the wel-
fare evaluation of cross-border acquisitions and privatization policies. If the
domestic country acquires a foreign ﬁrm, the domestic CS decreases, due to a
generalized increase in prices. As far as welfare is concerned, it certainly in-
creases if the acquisition price is not taken into account, since the proﬁts of
the acquired ﬁrm now enter the welfare computation. If, on the contrary, the
acquisition price is computed when evaluating welfare, then the latter increases
7However our result is consistent with the ﬁndings by Pal and Fjell (1996) in a Cournot
setting with homogenous product and convex costs.
7if the foreign ﬁrm is paid according to its pre-acquisition proﬁtability, while it
decreases if it is paid according to its post-acquisition proﬁtability. The oppo-
site considerations apply for the acquisition of a domestic ﬁrm by foreign agents.
Again, a comparison ceteris paribus with the quantity setting case shows a rel-
evant diﬀerence: under quantity competition the acquisition of a domestic ﬁrm
would never be welfare improving, even if the revenues from the acquisition were
added to welfare.
Finally, the privatization of the public ﬁrm is clearly both CS and welfare
detrimental.
3.1 The sequential game
The above discussion should have clariﬁed that the properties of equilibria under
price competition, and the diﬀerences with the corresponding outcome under
quantity competition, rely upon the very basic fact that the price decisions
of the public ﬁrm along its reaction function are taken for given prices of its
private rivals. While under quantity competition the expansion of a public ﬁrm
implies a reduction of the allocative ineﬃciency on the given quantity sold by the
private ﬁrms, under price competition the public ﬁrm can reduce the demand
faced by its private rivals at their given prices, but cannot aﬀect the price
over cost margin at which these quantities are sold. Strategic complementarity
and substitutability do not play a relevant role in deﬁning the key features of
equilibria.
On the contrary, the nature of strategic interaction becomes extremely rel-
evant when we extend the above set-up to allow for price competition in a
sequential game, with the public ﬁrm in the role of the leader and with the m
domestic and the n foreign private ﬁrms in the role of followers. All private
ﬁrms take the leader’s price as given and compete simultaneously in the second
stage of the game, while the leader moves in the ﬁrst stage, anticipating the
followers’ reactions. Without any loss of generality, in the analysis of this game
we assume c =0 .
Following the usual solution procedure of this Stackelberg game, we ob-
tain the following equilibrium prices of the sequential game for the welfare-









with z = h,f. The main implications of this solution are gathered in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 In a single-country mixed-oligopoly with price competition and
sequential moves, the public ﬁrm leader sets a price pS
i ≤ pN
i , while the private
ﬁrms set pS
z ≤ pN
z ;m o r e o v e r ,pS
i <p S
z, for any degree of product diﬀerentiation
and for any given number of private and foreign ﬁrms. The price pS
i is again
8decreasing in the share of foreign ﬁrms and is equal to the marginal cost when
m = n.
Sequentiality in price decisions with the public ﬁrm in the role of the leader
would create a more competitive and welfare enhancing environment even in a
closed-economy framework (Bárcena-Ruiz, 2007). The public ﬁrm anticipates
that a reduction of its own price will be followed by a reduction of the unit proﬁt
margin of the private ﬁrms, due to strategic complementarity; this lowers the
marginal negative impact on private proﬁts of the public ﬁrm’s price decrease,
allowing for pS
i to be closer than pN
i to marginal cost. The same positive eﬀect
on welfare would be observed under quantity competition, though in that case
it would be associated, due to strategic substitutability, to a decrease in the
production of the public ﬁrm (the price of which would exceed the marginal
cost) and an increase in that of the private ﬁrms.8
T h ep r e s e n c eo ff o r e i g nﬁrms causes a further decrease of the price set by
the public ﬁrm at equilibrium, along the same lines described for the simulta-
neous game; again, market openness creates an additional impulse towards a
generalized price reduction. The more aggressive attitude shown by the public
ﬁrm when it takes the role of the market price leader is such that the latter
behaves like a public monopolist when faced with an equal number of foreign
and domestic private competitors: only a market with n<mis consistent with
a positive price-over-cost margin, while a market where foreign ﬁrms play a
dominant role is one in which the public ﬁrm suﬀers from proﬁtl o s s e sa n di s
therefore inconsistent with a budget-balancing policy.
4 The two-country framework
We consider now a two-country model, in which two public ﬁrms, ﬁrm i and
ﬁrm j, located respectively in country H and F, compete in a common market
with m private ﬁrms from country H and n private ﬁrms from country F,
operating on this market regardless of their origin country. Therefore, we have
m + n +2ﬁrms, each producing a variety of a diﬀerentiated product, under
the same cost conditions of the previous section. The consumers of the two
countries are identical in tastes and size, so that the demand faced by each ﬁrm
on this international market now includes an identical demand from each of the
two countries.




(CSh + Πh) (A)
8If the public ﬁrm anticipates the rivals’ contraction associated to its expansion, it per-
ceives a trade-oﬀ between its own positive marginal contribution to welfare and the negative
marginal contribution from the rivals. This result relies on increasing marginal costs if product
homogeneity is assumed (Fjell and Heywood, 2002), but it is also observed under constant
marginal costs if we allow for product diﬀerentiation - case in which γ aﬀects the extent to
which the simultaneous and sequential solution diﬀer.
9where the proﬁts of a generic domestic ﬁrm are

















Notice that the consumer surplus is in both countries given by:
















The solution of problem (A) yields the best reply of the public ﬁrm of the








Similarly, the public ﬁrm in the foreign country faces the following problem:
max
pj
(CSf + Πf) (B)
where the proﬁts of a generic foreign ﬁrm f are
πf =( pf − c)(qh + qf)








Let us now consider the optimal behavior of each private domestic ﬁrm. Maxi-








In the same way, maximization of πf with respect to pf gives the optimal reply








Summing (9) over the m domestic ﬁrms and (10) over the n foreign ﬁrms and










By substituting into (9) and (10) p∗
i, p∗
j, and the aggregate equilibrium prices of







Inspection of the equilibrium prices allows to establish the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The prices p∗
h and p∗
f set respectively by the private domestic
and the private foreign ﬁr m sa l w a y sc o i n c i d e ,a sw e l la st h e i rp r o ﬁts. The
prices set by the public ﬁrms diﬀer provided that the number of private domes-
t i ca n dp r i v a t ef o r e i g nﬁrms diﬀers, with p∗
i ≥ p∗
j when m ≥ n,a n dv i c e v -
ersa. Moreover, for any given m ,w eﬁnd that p∗
i ≥ p∗
h when n ≤
γm−1






= m − 1. Similarly, for any given n, p∗
j ≥ p∗








= n − 1.
The ﬁrst two statements of Proposition 3 have an easy explanation. All
private ﬁrms set the same price, since they have identical objective function
and face the same market conditions. But if they are unevenly distributed
across countries, the objective functions of the two public ﬁrms diﬀer, with the
proﬁt component of welfare having a higher relative weight for the public ﬁrm
operating in the country with the largest share of private ﬁrms. Therefore, the
optimal reaction of this public ﬁrm to any given proﬁle of the prices of the rivals
is to set a higher price than the one which maximizes welfare for the other public
ﬁrm. Indeed, while the marginal beneﬁt in terms of higher consumer surplus of a
price reduction is the same for both public ﬁrms — produced quantities aﬀecting
the consumer surplus of both countries symmetrically and independently of the
origin country — the marginal cost in terms of lower domestic proﬁts is higher
for the public ﬁrm of the country where most private ﬁrms are located. The
balance is therefore obtained at a higher price.
These considerations also help to understand why, in the presence of an
asymmetry in the cross-country distribution of ﬁrms, the price of the public ﬁrm
can be higher than that of the private ﬁrms. Suppose that most private ﬁrms are
located in the domestic country. If the asymmetry is suﬃciently large, the public
ﬁrm of the foreign country perceives a strong incentive to set its price very close
to marginal cost, for any given proﬁle of the prices set by the rivals; this implies
that all the other ﬁrms (foreign and domestic) face a downward shift of their
demand functions. Under these tougher demand conditions, for the public do-
mestic ﬁrm the marginal beneﬁt on the consumer surplus of a price reduction is
very low, and the balance with its marginal cost in terms of domestic proﬁts may
well occur at a price higher than the individual proﬁt-maximizing price. When
its marginal impact on the consumer surplus through price changes becomes
11very low, a welfare-maximizing behavior at the margin resembles a collusive
behavior, which in our framework results into a protectionist-like attitude.9
This result extends to price competition the idea already put forth by Dad-
pay and Heywood (2006) in a quantity-setting framework with homogeneous
product. In their two-country model the degree of asymmetry required for the
domestic public ﬁrm to produce less than the private ﬁrms depends on the shares
of the two countries in market demand. In our model, the reversal in the level
of prices occurs for a cross-country asymmetry in the distribution of ﬁrms which
depends on the degree of product diﬀerentiation. Indeed, this reversal occurs as
a consequence of the reduction of demand faced by the private ﬁrms due to the
aggressiveness of the foreign public ﬁrm; as γ increases, the markets of the var-
ious ﬁrms become more interconnected and the spillover of the price decisions
of each ﬁrm on the demand faced by the others becomes stronger. Given that
the foreign public ﬁrm sets its price close to marginal cost, the demand contrac-
tion faced by the other ﬁrms is higher the higher is γ,s ot h a tf o ral o wd e g r e e
of product diﬀerentiation the incentive for the public domestic ﬁrm to take its
protectionist-like role emerges even in the presence of a moderate asymmetry.
Through the asymmetry in the country-distribution of ﬁrms, and the related
asymmetries in the public ﬁrms’ objective functions, the two-country model
allows for more complicated interactions among public and private ﬁrms. This
suggests that the answers to the related policy issues might be more complex
than in the simple single-country approach.
4.1 Eﬀects of cross-border acquisitions
In the two-country model the competition between public and private ﬁrms is
framed within a competition between public ﬁrms — i.e. between governments
interested in their own domestic welfare. If ﬁrms are symmetrically distributed,
the objectives of the two public ﬁrms are perfectly aligned, while any asymmetry
in the distribution of ﬁrms creates an asymmetry in their objective functions
and in their behavior. This simple fact is at the basis of the welfare evaluation
of cross-border acquisitions summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 In a two-country model the aggregate welfare is maximum and
the aggregate consumer surplus is minimum when ﬁrms are evenly distributed
across countries. The cross-border acquisition of a private ﬁrm increases welfare
in the acquiring country and decreases welfare in the other. The overall eﬀect
on aggregate welfare depends on whether the acquisition widens (the eﬀect is
9The solution of the corresponding sequential game, with the two public ﬁrms acting as
leaders, exhibits a similar pattern. Sequentiality implies that in the symmetric distribution
case, the price set by the public and the private ﬁrms are lower than those of the simulta-
neous game. However, in the asymmetric case, the price set by the public ﬁrm of the most
populated country is higher than that of the corresponding simultaneous game, with the price
reversal occurring for lower values of γ. Indeed, the possibility to anticipate the private ﬁrms’
reaction to the public ﬁrms’ price decisions strenghtens the protectionist attitude induced by
the diﬀerences between countries.
12negative) or narrows (the eﬀect is positive) the asymmetry of the distribution of
ﬁrms.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
When ﬁrms are unevenly distributed, the actual share of proﬁts and con-
sumer surplus in domestic welfare is diﬀerent in the two countries. This implies
that in an aggregate perspective, one public ﬁrm is ’too’ aggressive and the other
’too’ cautious — an imbalance which favours consumers but reduces aggregate
welfare. The country-speciﬁce ﬀects are unambiguous and consistent with the
standard ﬁndings of the literature.
4.2 Eﬀects of privatization
When investigating the welfare eﬀects of privatization in a two-country model,
we may take two diﬀerent perspectives. The ﬁrst is to evaluate the welfare
eﬀects (in aggregate and on the individual countries) of unilateral privatization;
t h es e c o n di st oa s s e s st h ee ﬀects (aggregate and country-speciﬁc) of coordinated
privatization. In the ﬁr s tc a s ew et a k et h en o n - c o o p e r a t i v ep e r s p e c t i v eo ft h e
strategic competition among governments; in the second we take the cooperative
view of a supra-national authority.
The analysis of unilateral privatization amounts to comparing the outcome
of the model with m + n +2ﬁrms described above with that of a two-country
model where the demand coming from the two countries is satisﬁed only by
private ﬁrms (increased by one) in the country which privatizes, and by m +1
or n +1(the private and the remaining public) ﬁrms in the other.
Calculations are tedious but straightforward and yield the results summa-
rized in Proposition 5.10
Proposition 5 The qualitative and quantitative eﬀects of unilateral privatiza-
tions depend on γ and the degree of asymmetry in the distribution of ﬁrms. (a)
If ﬁrms are evenly distributed, unilateral privatization is welfare detrimental for
the country which privatizes, while the other country is positively aﬀected only
for suﬃciently high values of γ — the threshold degree of product diﬀerentiation
negatively depending on the number of private ﬁrms; aggregate welfare slightly
increases for γ close to 1.( b )I fﬁrms are unevenly distributed and the privati-
zation is realized in the most populated country, then welfare slightly increases
in the privatizing country if γ approaches from below the value at which the
price reversal in the initial situation occurs; welfare in the other country and
aggregate welfare both increase if γ is higher than this value, and decrease if this
condition is not met. (c) If ﬁrms are unevenly distributed and the privatization
is realized in the less populated country, then it is always welfare detrimental for
the privatizing country, while it is welfare improving for the other country for a
large set of values of γ — aggregate welfare increasing provided that the value of
γ is suﬃciently high.
10Simulations are presented in Appendix 2.1.
13There are several interesting results in the above proposition. The ﬁrst is
that there are market structures in which unilateral privatization is welfare
enhancing in the privatizing country. This occurs when the distribution of ﬁrms
is uneven, and γ approaches the value at which the price reversal occurs. In this
situation the private and public prices are almost aligned, and the increase in
proﬁts associated to privatization turn out to overcompensate the decrease in the
CS. The second is the positive impact on the non-privatizing country under
even distribution of ﬁrms, for high values of γ.W h e n γ is suﬃciently high,
there is a relevant demand shift from the privatizing to the non-privatizing
country, the market structure of which allows for a full exploitation of this
demand beneﬁt in terms of welfare. Finally, we stress the positive aggregate
welfare impact of unilateral privatization, when it is realized in the country in
which the price reversal between private and public ﬁrms is initially observed.
Since in that case the welfare-maximizing role of the public ﬁrm in the most
populated country collapses into a sort of protectionist attitude, its privatization
implies a generalized price decrease, which generates a large welfare gain in the
other country, where the CS has a relatively higher weight in national welfare.
The welfare (proﬁts) loss in the privatizing country does not compensate in
aggregate, due to the low level of demand faced by its ﬁrms which compete
with a very aggressive public ﬁrm in the non-privatizing country. Were instead
the less populated country to privatize, then the overall market competitiveness
would be relaxed, and price would increase, with obvious beneﬁts for the ﬁrms
of the other country. CS decreases, but aggregate welfare may increase, if the
demand spillovers from the privatizing to the non-privatizing country are large
enough — which occurs for high values of γ.
Notwithstanding this rich set of implications in terms of country-speciﬁca n d
aggregate eﬀects of unilateral privatization, the result that it generally causes
a welfare loss for the privatizing country has the obvious consequence that in
this two-country model non-privatization is in most cases a dominant strategy
for welfare-maximizing, self-interested governments. This brings us to consider
the alternative perspective of coordinated privatization, which could be possibly
considered by supra-national authorities. In order to assess the impact of this
cooperative approach to privatization, we compare the model with m + n +2
ﬁrms with a standard Bertrand oligopoly in the common international mar-
ket. Welfare comparisons between these diﬀerent set-ups lead to the following
proposition.11
Proposition 6 If ﬁrms are evenly distributed across countries, coordinated pri-
vatization reduces the individual country and global welfare, except in the case
in which γ is close to 1. If ﬁrms are unevenly distributed, welfare decreases
unambiguously in the less populated country, while it increases in the other for
al a r g er a n g eo fs u ﬃciently high values of γ. There is also a (high) threshold
value of γ above which global welfare increases.
The fact that under a symmetric distribution of ﬁrms, an aggregate welfare
11Simulations are presented in Appendix 2.2.
14increase can occur only for very high values of γ should not come as a surprise.
As we approach the conditions of the standard Bertrand competition with ho-
mogeneous product, the interaction between private ﬁr m si ss u ﬃcient to attain
maximum welfare. In this environment, the presence of competing public ﬁrms
concerned with their domestic welfare may paradoxically create a friction in
the aggregate welfare enhancing competition among private ﬁrms. When the
distribution of ﬁrms is asymmetric, the disadvantages of the coordinated priva-
tization fall on the country in which the CS has a relatively higher weight in
the welfare function. For a large set of values of γ, the other country — where
proﬁts have a larger relative role — beneﬁts from the redistribution of demand
and the increase in the prices of the private ﬁrms associated to the joint pri-
vatization. Again, when γ becomes suﬃciently high, this demand eﬀect in the
most populated country and the competition eﬀect among private ﬁrms create
the scope for an aggregate welfare increase.
This analysis suggests a more careful evaluation of the advantages of joint
privatization than that presented by Dadpay and Heywood (2006): under price
competition with constant marginal costs and diﬀerentiated products a coor-
dinated privatization is often detrimental for aggregate welfare, while for the
latter to increase very well deﬁned market conditions are required.
4.3 Concluding remarks
This paper is a ﬁrst attempt to provide a systematic analysis of price competition
with imperfect product substitutability in international oligopolistic mixed mar-
kets. By exploring the properties of market equilibria in a single-country and in
a two-country model, and by investigating the welfare consequences of privatiza-
tion and acquisitions, we have conﬁrmed that in most cases public ﬁrms actually
play on these markets a role of market regulators. Within a single-country ap-
proach, we have shown that, for any degree of product substitutability and any
market structure, public ﬁrms are always successful in enforcing internal market
discipline, by inducing all private ﬁrms to keep lower prices and by reacting to
international competition with further beneﬁcial price reductions.
Public ﬁrms can be looked at as an instrument of indirect regulation, also
in the presence of interactions between governments in international markets.
In a two-country model, this indirect regulatory role is preserved at the coun-
try level with negligible exceptions, but it may vanish in a global perspective
if the degree of product substitutability is suﬃciently high. Indeed, the policy
prescriptions which emerge in this context suggest that the welfare improving
character of public enterprises is preserved in aggregate, provided that the mar-
ket is not too close to homogeneous product conditions and provided that the
domestic welfare objectives do not result in a sort of protection of domestic prof-
its. If a protectionist-like behavior arises, with a public ﬁrm setting the highest
price observed in the market, there are arguments in favour of coordinated pri-
vatizations. This occurs when there are relevant cross-country asymmetries in
the distribution of ﬁrms, which disalign the objectives pursued by the public
ﬁrms of diﬀerent countries. Any increase in the degree of product substitutabil-
15ity enlarges the set of market conﬁgurations supporting this outcome. When
products become very close substitutes, coordinated privatizations increase ag-
gregate welfare even in the presence of a symmetric distribution of ﬁrms: the
strategic interaction of ﬁrms pursuing domestic-wide — and not market-wide —
objectives generates less eﬃcient outcomes than the simple interaction of proﬁt-
maximizing ﬁrms.
The overall implication of this analysis is that international markets where
governments compete through their ﬁrms, and compete with private ﬁrms, may
require a supra-national coordination to achieve global welfare gains. While
single governments do not perceive incentives to privatize, supra-national bodies
should suggest coordinated privatization policies when the tension between the
objectives of the public ﬁrms becomes welfare detrimental. However, these
prescriptions are appropriate only in very well deﬁned market conﬁgurations
and cannot be considered as a general rule.
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P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . Let us denote with CS(c,γ,m,n) the consumer
surplus evaluated at the two-country model equilibrium. Moreover, denote with
W (c,γ,m,n), Wh (c,γ,m,n),a n dWf (c,γ,m,n), respectively the aggregate,
the home country and the foreign country welfare evaluated at the same equi-
librium.
Be k the total number of private ﬁrms. By substituting n = k − m into
W (c,γ,m,n), we obtain that
∂W(c,γ,m,k−m)
∂m =0= ⇒ m = k
2
F o l l o w i n gt h es a m ep r o c e d u r e ,w eg e t
∂CS(c,γ,m,k−m)
∂m =0= ⇒ m = k
2
The behaviour of the aggregate welfare and consumer surplus functions are
shown in ﬁgures A1.1 and A1.2, for c =0 , k =2 0and γ =0 .5.
Figure A1: Aggregate welfare and consumer surplus as functions of m
Therefore aggregate welfare is maximum and the consumer surplus is mini-
mum when private ﬁrms are evenly distributed. The aggregate implications of
cross-border acquisitions follow straightforwardly. As far as the country-speciﬁc
implications are concerned, assume that the home country acquires a foreign






















This concludes the proof.
Appendix 2. Privatization in the two-country
model
In this appendix we provide graphical simulations for the results stated in Propo-
sitions 5 and 6.12
A2.1 Unilateral privatization
Unilateral privatization under even distribution of ﬁrms
Let us start with an even distribution of ﬁrms, i.e. m =4and n =4and consider
a unilateral privatization in one of the two countries (country F). Figures A2.1-
A2.3 show the changes in the welfare of the privatizing country, the welfare of
the non-privatizing country and the aggregate welfare, for the diﬀerent relevant
values of γ.
Figure A2.1. The eﬀect on the privatizing country
12Details of the calculations are available from the authors upon the request.
19Figure A2.2. The eﬀect on the non-privatizing country
Figure A2.3. The eﬀect on aggregate welfare
Unilateral privatization under uneven distribution of ﬁrms
Assume now an uneven distribution of ﬁrms, e.g. m =2and n =4 .I nt h i sc a s e
the price reversal occurs in the foreign country for γ =0 .5. We have now to
consider two case: privatization in the most populated and in the less populated
country. Figure A2.4-A2.6 show the eﬀects of the privatization in the ﬁrst case,
while Figures A2.7-A2-9 refer to the second.
20Privatization in the most populated country
Figure A2.4. The eﬀect on the privatizing country
Figure A2.5. The eﬀect on the non-privatizing country
Figure A2.6. The eﬀect on aggregate welfare
21Privatization in the less populated country
Figure A2.7. The eﬀect on the privatizing country
Figure A2.8. The eﬀect on the non-privatizing country
Figure A2.9. The eﬀect on aggregate welfare
22A2.2 Coordinated privatization
Again, we distinguish between the two cases of even and uneven distribution of
ﬁrms.
Coordinated privatization under even distribution of ﬁrms
In this case the eﬀects on welfare are obviously the same in the two countries.
Aggregate welfare is simply the double of country-speciﬁc welfare. Figure A2.10
shows the country-speciﬁce ﬀect for m = n =4 .
Figure A2.10. The eﬀect on country-speciﬁcw e l f a r e
Coordinated privatization under uneven distribution of ﬁrms
Assume, as before, m =2and n =4 . Figure A2.11-A2.13 show the eﬀects of
a coordinated privatization on the most populated country, the less populated
country and aggregate welfare.
Figure A2.11. The eﬀect on the most populated country
23Figure A2.12. The eﬀect in the less populated country
Figure A2.13. The eﬀect on aggregate welfare
24